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ABSTRACT
The 1928 Olympic Winter Games in St Moritz was the first inter-
national sports competition in Switzerland to bring together the
country’s Olympic and sport circles, its hotel industry and local
authorities. Doing so crystallized public and semi-public actions
around an event capable of making or breaking Switzerland’s
reputation as a tourist destination. In addition, the Swiss govern-
ment, which did not directly initiate the project, ensured the
event would serve the aims of its foreign policy by placing a for-
eign ministry representative on the organising committee. The
involvement of these stakeholders meant that the games mainly
affected three interconnected areas: tourism – hosting the Games
was a way of fending off competition from other winter sports
destinations; diplomacy – the event allowed the Foreign Ministry
to bolster Switzerland’s image abroad; and domestic politics –
obtaining and staging the Olympics led to the development of a





Switzerland first contemplated the question of whether hosting the Olympic Winter
Games could boost tourism in the 1920s with an eye to bringing the 1928 winter
Olympics to St Moritz, almost a century before Lausanne staged the 2020 Youth
Olympic Games. It had established itself as a leading European tourism destination
during the nineteenth century, mostly thanks to the British, who came to convalesce
in the mountain air or to seek inspiration among the Alps.1 The two countries’ close
economic and political ties and their shared penchant for liberal ideas facilitated this
early development. Although Switzerland remained the paradigm for mountain
tourism throughout the nineteenth century, by the 1890s increasing competition from
Germany, Austria and France had eroded the country’s monopoly over summer
tourists.2 World War I dealt a further blow to the sector, which stagnated as borders
closed, Europeans’ spending power slumped and the Swiss franc appreciated in value.
The federal government responded by introducing a plan to help the tourism
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industry, centred round a business support fund called the Societe Suisse de Credit
Hôtelier.3 In turn, the tourism sector took steps to attract domestic visitors and
decided to promote the newly fashionable activities of automobile tourism and winter
sports in order to create an image of Switzerland as ‘the playground of the world’.4
After World War I, European States became increasingly interested in using sport
for their international relations, not only through events like the Olympic games but
also through specific sports like soccer.5 This was the case even in Switzerland, whose
historiography is strongly attached to the idea of sport autonomy.6 When it comes to
international sport competitions and the use of sport by governments during that
period, authors often refer to European neutral countries as ‘small states’.7 Despite
the benefits of this approach, it would be
more useful to consider Switzerland as an important alpine country in strong
competition with other tourist destinations, as this explains why various stakeholders
worked together to defend this image.8 With the rapid growth of mass media, holding
the 1928 Olympic games in St Moritz was expected to provide excellent publicity for the
country and its resorts, and thereby boost both summer and winter tourism.9 Hotel
owners saw the event as a way to gain an advantage over their competitors in the Alps
and in Scandinavia, while sporting circles did not want to miss the chance of staging the
Olympic games in Switzerland, the home of the International Olympic Committee
(IOC) and the cradle of winter sports. A disparate group of people and organizations
with seemingly divergent objectives came together to stage the 1928 Olympic Winter
Games. The effort required to bring the Olympic games to St Moritz helped create a
sports lobby within the highest echelons of the Swiss state and parliament during the
1920s. Hence, Switzerland sowed the initial seeds of its foreign policy on sport in its
domestic politics. The Swiss Olympic Committee (SOC) enabled St Moritz to obtain the
Olympics, and the Federal Political Department (DPF) – responsible for foreign affairs –
represented the government in sporting circles and in coordinating the various
stakeholders. Nevertheless, it proved difficult for the country and its diplomats to
counter criticism of the Games from the Nordic countries, which wanted to prevent the
nascent winter Olympics overshadowing the Nordic Games, created partly to attract
tourists to Scandinavia, and to challenge Switzerland’s claim to be the land of winter
sports.10 Thus, the challenges facing Swiss tourism in the early 1920s (tourism) led to
debates on the domestic front, resulting in new alliances thanks to the Olympic Games
(domestic politics), which served the interests of the Swiss foreign policy (diplomacy).
From Discovering Winter Sports to Creating a National Sport and
Tourism Lobby
Bringing the 1928 Olympic Winter Games to St Moritz was part of a longstanding
effort to develop tourism in Switzerland, especially by promoting winter sports.
According to Cedric Humair, the history of Swiss tourism between the mid-
eighteenth century and World War I can be divided into three phases.11 The first
phase covered the period up to 1820, when travellers began considering Switzerland
a destination in its own right, rather than just a point of passage en-route to other
countries. The ‘progressive industrialization of tourism’, due to the introduction of
steamships on Switzerland’s lakes and the extension of the Swiss (and European)
railway network, characterized phase two, from 1820 to 1875. Finally, a substantial
increase in tourism and the creation of trade associations aimed at improving
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collaboration between the tourism sector and the public authorities followed a
decade of crisis during phase three, from 1875 to 1914. Winter sports came to the
Alps in the 1860s and quickly grew in popularity, initially in the Grisons canton
(home to St Moritz and Davos), and then in western Switzerland. However,
consensus on how winter sports began in Switzerland still does not exist. Some
historians maintain that patients and tourists created sports such as tobogganing
and skating by adapting traditional modes of transport for amusement, whereas
others suggest that hoteliers invented these sports as a way of attracting guests
through the winter.12
What is more, each resort has its own founding legend. For Davos, St Moritz’s
neighbour and rival, the best-known story attributes the rise from poor mountain
village to international resort to a German political refugee and doctor called
Alexander Spengler and his sanatorium’s first two patients. Spengler’s name is still
intrinsically linked to Davos thanks to the Spengler Cup, the world’s oldest
international ice hockey competition, which was founded in 1923 and named by Carl
Spengler in homage to his father, Alexander. In fact, ice skating was Davos’ first
winter sport, having begun in the mid-1860s, although skaters had to travel to the
frozen lake, some distance from the resort’s hotels. This drawback was overcome in
1869, when the first artificial ice rink was built in the gardens of the Curhaus Hotel.
During the following decade, British tourists began coming to Davos in ever greater
numbers and founded several clubs, including, in 1889, a skating club affiliated to the
British ice skating association and based at the Hotel Buol.13 This early specialization
in skating – and then ice hockey14 – meant Davos had a special place in the hearts of
the International Skating Union (ISU) and resulted in the village hosting 19
international figure skating and speed skating championships between 1899 and
1925.15 Furthermore, Hans Valaer, the president of western Switzerland’s tourist
board during the 1920s, joined the ISU’s council in 1907 and the federation held its
14th annual congress in Davos in 1925.16
In St Moritz, winter tourism is said to have originated with the hotelier Johannes
Badrutt, who supposedly offered his summer guests at the Engadiner Kulm free
accommodation if they came back in winter. The veracity of this story remains
uncertain, but it is likely that Badrutt and his guests at the Kulm wanted to compete
with the neighbouring resort of Davos, which already had toboggan runs and
competitions. Together, they formed the Outdoor Amusements Committee in 1884
and the following year St Moritz saw the launch of a specialist tourism journal and
the founding of the St Moritz Tobogganing Club.17 Nevertheless, skating remained
the most popular winter sport here, too, and by 1913 St Moritz had 18 ice rinks,
which enabled it to host the European Ice Hockey Championships in 1922.18 Skiing
was introduced to Switzerland in the 1890s and gradually grew in popularity,
especially after World War I, partly as a result of support from the Swiss army,
which recognized skiing’s military uses.19 However, tourism remained depressed
during the post-war period, so St Moritz needed to find ways to bring back visitors.
In this respect, hosting the Olympic Winter Games was seen as an ideal tool for
promoting both the resort and the country, and for creating closer ties between the
Swiss authorities and the Olympic system.
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Contributing to the development of Olympic internationalism was an important
goal for the heads of Swiss sport, who joined forces with the country’s hoteliers in
order to host international sport competitions, which were growing in size and
attracting ever greater media coverage. They were not alone in taking an interest in
the Olympics. Contrary to what is described in the meagre historiography of Swiss
sport, by the 1920s the Swiss government had begun to realize how important
international sport, and therefore the Olympic games, were becoming. However, a lot
of resistance remained to both the collaboration between sport and the hotel trade
and the government’s stance on international sport, most notably from the Swiss
military, which still exercised a large degree of control over sport in interwar
Switzerland. It is not our aim to overemphasize the army’s antipathy against other
forms of physical education than gymnastics. In fact, the Swiss military organized
many football games between military teams during World War I.20
However, the military aversion to the Olympic games is very real. The army held
enough sway over the Swiss gymnastics federation (Societe Federale de Gymnastique),
which was in conflict with the country’s other sport organizations, to ensure it turned
down a Swiss government subsidy for taking part in the 1920 Antwerp Olympics.
The Swiss military felt that the Federal Department of Defence (DMF), which was
responsible for physical education, should confine itself to encouraging gymnastics
and exercise, rather than encouraging participation in ‘costly sparring matches in a
foreign city’.21 As a result, the SOC had to lobby members of the government very
hard in order to obtain even a small contribution to taking part in the Olympics.
Nevertheless, in 1922 the sports sector gained a more powerful voice with the
creation of the Association Nationale d’Education Physique (ANEP - National
Association for Physical Education), an umbrella organization to coordinate the work
of Switzerland’s sport federations in all areas, not just the Olympics. This change can
be seen clearly in the Federal Council’s discussions on the 1924 summer Olympics in
Paris, during which the DMF endorsed the sport federations’ request for a
government subsidy.22 Support for sport was also becoming more widespread among
members of Switzerland’s parliament, such as Adrien Lachenal, a radical (liberal)
member of Geneva’s Grand Council. Lachenal, whose father had been a member of
the Swiss government, was a founding member of the automobile section of the
Touring Club of Switzerland and had close ties with the tourism sector, so he felt
that Switzerland should not pass up the opportunity to shine during the International
Week of Winter Sport in Chamonix in January 1924:
I am thinking, for example, of skiing, which is becoming our national sport and in
which, over the last few years, we can be proud to have claimed the upper hand. In the
past it was the Norwegians and Swedes, who exported this sport to us, who could be
considered the incontestable masters. Today, thanks to the particularly favourable
geography of our Swiss mountains, thanks to the physical abilities of our youth, it can
be said that Switzerland has overtaken the Norwegians in skiing.23
At a time when winter sports were becoming ever more important in attracting
hotel guests, Lachenal’s views on sport were nothing less than a statement of support
for Swiss tourism. He even noted that foreign teams were coming to Switzerland to
train before competing in the forthcoming winter games in Chamonix and expressed
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the fear that refusing to subsidize the country’s participation in the event led other
teams to boycott Switzerland and make it impossible for the country to host future
Olympic games.24 That the tourism sector accorded great importance to sport can be
seen not only in their representations to parliament, but also in hotel trade journals,
which carried articles announcing, for example, the English ice hockey team’s arrival
in the resort of Villars in January 1924.25 Nevertheless, hoteliers were also wary of
the potential difficulties involved in staging the Olympic Games, with the Revue
Suisse des Hôtels noting that the Paris Olympics had not benefitted the city’s hotels,
restaurants and shops due to tourists avoiding the city during the event due to
worries about finding accommodation.26
In order to circumvent any doubts about hosting the Olympics, towards the end of
1924 the press in the Grisons canton, home to Davos and St Moritz, began
promoting the idea that the next Olympic Winter Games should be held in
Switzerland. The Engadiner Post, St Moritz council’s official newspaper, claimed that
the sports sector was enthusiastic about this idea. The editor quoted his colleagues at
the Basler Nachrichten, Basel’s liberal-conservative, protestant newspaper, who felt
that the competition was intense. Indeed, Norway was also hoping to host the event
as part of the 300th anniversary celebrations for the city of Christiania, the country’s
capital, whose name changed to Oslo. Hosting the Olympic games was an excellent
way to publicise the new name.27 Given this potential competition for the games, the
Basler Nachrichten demanded to take all necessary measures to ensure the choice of
Switzerland ahead of Norway. Sport, the official journal of the SOC and many Swiss
sport federations, published a similarly patriotic article:
Ask anyone: no country is better known and more greatly appreciated for winter sports
than Switzerland. Only us, the Swiss, appear to be unaware of this. … Our high-altitude
stadiums are the most suited to the modern Olympic Winter Games. Let’s do what we
need to do for the name of Switzerland and for one of our most important economic
sectors. Let’s get to work! The 1928 Olympic Winter Games belong to Switzerland.28
Although articles such as this gave an outward impression of confidence, fears
lurked behind the scenes because the Nordic countries were dangerous rivals and it
was against them that the battle for Swiss tourism had to be fought. In order to win
this battle, the tourism and sports sectors had to come together and find a unity of
purpose. They had achieved this by the end of 1924, but they still had to gain the
support of the Federal government if they were to convince the IOC to award the
games to Switzerland. At this period, the struggles faced by the tourism industry
shifted to exacerbate existing domestic policy issues, including local rivalries.
Obtaining the Games Despite Local and International Rivalries
St Moritz had become a well-known winter sports resort by the end of the nineteenth
century, but it struggled to regain its earlier dynamism during the years following
World War I, in contrast to neighbouring Davos, buoyed by the success of its
sanatoriums.29 As a result, in addition to competing with foreign destinations, the
two resorts were vying to outdo each other by building new winter sports facilities
and by becoming the first Swiss resort to obtain the Olympics. Besides this local
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rivalry, Pierre de Coubertin faced difficulties at a national level. By the beginning of
the twentieth century, he had come to admire Switzerland’s social and political
model, and the country’s centrality and neutrality, but he was not blind to the
resistance to sport in the country.30 For example, in his Olympic Memoirs he
criticizes Swiss sport for not having an international outlook: ‘Switzerland had its
gymnasts, its marksmen, its Alpine wrestlers and stopped there. It did not aspire to
outside honours and used its mountains for walking and not yet for winter sports’.31
In addition, politicians often regarded Coubertin’s Olympic project with indifference,
while gymnasts and the military saw it with opposition, even though the IOC had
moved its headquarters to Switzerland in 1915. Despite his contacts within the
government, Olympic circles and the press, and the increasing likelihood that
Switzerland was asked to host the Olympic Games, he struggled to find majority
support in the 1920s.
However, some people did recognize the potential value of embracing the
Olympics. For example, the December 1924 issue of the Revue Suisse des Hôtels
began with an article entitled ‘Will the 1928 Olympic Winter Games be held in
Switzerland?’, which argued that it was in the interests of sport organizations, health
and winter sports resorts and the railways to support the project in every way
possible.32 The author went on to encourage the Swiss tourist board to organize a
conference of all the stakeholders, while the magazine’s editor felt that any Swiss
winter Olympics should be shared between St Moritz and Davos, the Bernese
Oberland, Central Switzerland, and French-speaking Switzerland in order to avoid
excessive rivalry between resorts. On the other hand, the IOC’s objective was to
exercise control over new winter competitions, despite resistance from some
international federations, especially the ISU. That is why Coubertin tried to close the
debate over who hosted the 1928 winter Olympics by setting out the IOC’s position
in the pages of Sport Suisse, a propaganda sheet for the sport sector in French-
speaking Switzerland that became later one of the games’ official newspapers.
According to Coubertin’s article, the issues being raised in Switzerland were
irrelevant because the Netherlands, like France in 1924, was due to host both the
summer and winter Olympics, so the only city to stage Olympic games in 1928 was
Amsterdam.33 In response, a journalist writing in the Revue Suisse des Hôtels accused
him of a ‘blatantly obvious smokescreen’:
At this time, Switzerland is the only major winter sports centre. In this respect it enjoys
an incontestable worldwide reputation. That this advantageous situation arouses jealousy
is easy to understand. So it is no surprise that certain interested parties are looking for a
way of taking away, as often as they can, the core of our winter clientele by rotating
competitions from country to country. Much ado will be made about areas that are
currently unknown as winter sports resorts … and that will take away from our Swiss
resorts. … Therefore, it is not a matter of us putting forward new advantages; our aim
is to defend our position and protect our winter resorts. This idea of a winter sports
cycle appears to me to be a great danger for Switzerland; I feel it is imperative to
address it and to prevent the consequences before it is too late.34
Beyond this criticism of Coubertin’s universalist vision, Switzerland’s hoteliers
were mostly worried that the winter Olympics increased competition from other
tourist destinations, most notably those in Nordic countries, especially if Switzerland
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did not host the event often enough. Nevertheless, the specialist press continued to
criticize Switzerland, for example, suggesting that Swiss resorts did not have enough
snow, which was not the case in Sweden. Thus, some hoteliers feared that Sweden’s
J€amtland region and its capital, Åre, would dethrone the Engadine region of
Switzerland, home to St Moritz, and siphon off some of its British tourists: ‘The
Swedes want to contest our title as Europe’s winter sports paradise. They justify their
claims with very clear arguments, the first of which is that snow sports did not
originate in Switzerland, but in the Nordic countries’.35
Consequently, Switzerland had to define a clear position within the country before
trying to promote its case abroad. During a meeting of the ANEP’s central committee
on January 18, 1925, four months before the IOC Session in Prague, the SOC’s
president, William Hirschy, warned the other members: ‘We must be ready to say
whether or not we would like to take on the Games’.36 He also felt that Switzerland’s
sport sector should ensure it was up to the task. Although some ANEP members
warned against addressing the issue solely from the hotelier’s point of view, revealing
a division between the interests of certain sport federations and the tourism sector,
both sides worked together to gain the support of the Swiss government. To this end,
the presidents of the SOC and the ANEP, accompanied by Albert Junod, the head of
the Swiss tourist board, met with Karl Scheurer, the head of the DMF.37 Scheurer
assured them of the government’s moral support, ‘given the importance of this event
to Switzerland, both from the point of view of developing physical exercise and from
the point of view of tourism’.38 At its 1925 Session, held in Prague from May 26 to
28, the IOC’s members agreed to hold the Olympic Winter Games every four years,
the same year as the summer Olympics. This meeting also provided an occasion for
Godefroy de Blonay, Switzerland’s IOC member, to enter Switzerland’s bid to host
the 1928 winter Olympics and present his country’s geographical advantages.39
However, relations between the IOC and Switzerland were soon to fray. Jean-Marie
Musy, the very conservative Swiss president and head of the Finance and Customs
Department, gave a speech during the Federal Gymnastics Festival, held in Geneva
from July 17 to 21, 1925, in which he supported gymnastics in its conflict against
modern sports: ‘The type of sport that offers only the conquest of meaningless
records, the preparation of stars and champions, is a pernicious sport’.40 Coubertin,
just back from Prague, watched the speech in astonishment. The next day he wrote
to his friend Ernest Chuard, a federal councillor:
Musy’s speech was the clearest condemnation of the entire Olympic doctrine and …
the International Committee, a league of the peoples of 45 nations whose head office
has been in Lausanne for ten years, finds itself attacked most plainly by this speech …
What imports is the attitude taken publicly against an international organization that
could expect to be immune from such acts by the highest-ranking person in the country
in which it is based! Before letting my colleagues draw the consequences of this
unpleasant incident … I am appealing to your friendship and advising you of the
indispensable need to find a way of erasing the impression it produced.41
Without saying so openly, Coubertin was making a clear threat: Switzerland could
lose the opportunity to stage the 1928 winter Olympics. Chuard’s efforts to mediate
between Coubertin and President Musy appear to have worked, as the incident did
not adversely affect the campaign to obtain the Olympic games. Nevertheless, the
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Realpolitik approach Coubertin used to defend the IOC’s interests put pressure on
the Swiss, who had to remain circumspect and overcome the local and international
rivalries that were beginning to emerge.
When the IOC’s Executive Committee, meeting in Paris in November 1925,
pressed the SOC to designate its candidate, de Blonay admitted that St Moritz,
Engelberg and Davos were vying for the right to host the event. However, only the
first two of these towns had put forward ‘firm proposals’ at this stage and the
Executive Committee seemed to prefer St Moritz.42 Coubertin went as far as drafting
a letter to the IOC’s members suggesting that they choose St Moritz, but it was
decided not to send the letter until St Moritz and the SOC had provided new
guarantees. The SOC asked the heads of St Moritz’s and Davos’ bids to come to Bern
on November 22 for what turned out to be a very tense meeting. The hotelier Emil
Thoma-Badrutt, the first president of the Ski Club Alpina and the developer of the
funicular railway from St Moritz to the Chantarelle Plateau, represented St Moritz.
According to Thoma-Badrutt’s account in the Engadiner Post, published four days
later, Davos’ supporters came to the meeting with the firm intention of dissuading
the IOC from choosing St Moritz by dragging their rival into the ‘manure’ and by
claiming that winter sports in St Moritz were run merely to benefit spa companies
and hoteliers, not sportspeople.43 For Thoma-Badrutt, it was no surprise that the ISU
and Dutch press, which had close ties with Davos, tried to derail St Moritz’s bid.
Paul M€uller, a Davos resident and president of the Swiss Ice Hockey Federation,
replied the following week in the same newspaper, suggesting that Thoma-Badrutt’s
reading of the situation was misleading. According to M€uller, the SOC’s decision to
support St Moritz’s bid was the result of lobbying by a few members, rather than
being based on the merits of the technical reports submitted to the committee:
Swiss sport has the right to demand that the Olympic Winter Games are held in the
place that provides the best guarantees for the staging of the competitions and the
smooth running of the event. It is unacceptable that individuals use their official
position within the association to impose their personal opinion.44
In fact, M€uller was lobbying on behalf of the ISU, whose president and secretary
were from Sweden and who feared the IOC was trying to take control over their
sport. They felt it was up to the ISU to decide where skating events should take
place. These manoeuvres were primarily motivated by the threat the Olympic Winter
Games posed to the Nordic Games, which had been created by Viktor Balck, another
Swede and a former president of the ISU. As part of his counter-offensive against St
Moritz, M€uller invited the IOC’s new president, Henri de Baillet-Latour, to stay at
Davos’ Grand Hôtel and Belvedere, from 14 to 20 January 1926. To entice Baillet-
Latour to Davos, M€uller scheduled the visit to coincide with the European Ice
Hockey Championships, from January 11 to 17 (which was won by Switzerland), the
European Bobsleigh Championships, from January 18 to 19, and a meeting of
delegates from the International Ski Federation. He also ensured that Hans Valaer,
who was secretary of Davos International Ice Skating Club and a member of the
ISU’s Central Committee, as well as president of the western Switzerland tourist
board, was present. In addition, M€uller asked Baillet-Latour to attend a meeting of
the four international winter sport federations, which would ‘greatly facilitate the
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resolution of several current issues’.45 As the founder and president of Davos Hockey
Club, M€uller undoubtedly had a strong attachment to Davos, which may partly
explain why he was so keen to persuade the IOC’s president to prefer Davos over St
Moritz and thereby break ranks with his predecessor as IOC president, Pierre de
Coubertin, who openly favoured St Moritz. This hypothesis is supported by M€uller’s
efforts to promote Davos during the 1920s, related in the Revue Suisse des Hôtels, and
his contribution to creating the Spengler Cup.46 Thus, at a time when Davos was
increasingly attracting an elite clientele, notably due to its international sports events,
the rivalry between St Moritz and Davos was central to the question of which of the
two Grisons resorts should host the Olympics.
The IOC’s Executive Committee addressed the issue on March 7 and 8, 1926, in
Paris. However, before the Olympic Winter Games could be awarded to Switzerland,
it had to ask Baron de Schimmelpenninck, the Netherlands’ IOC member and
president of the organising committee for the 1928 summer Olympics in Amsterdam,
to officially withdraw from hosting the winter games. This meeting also provided an
occasion for Switzerland’s IOC member, de Blonay, to report on his negotiations
with the SOC and with the towns of Davos, Engelberg and St Moritz, and to present
their bids and the contracts they had signed. After studying these documents, the
Executive Committee found that St Moritz offered the most affordable
accommodation but recorded reservations about Engelberg’s bid due to its climate
and low altitude. This latter remark came primarily from the skiing community. The
SOC and sport federations felt that St Moritz’s and Davos’ bids were ‘roughly
equal’.47 Nevertheless, Baillet-Latour was concerned about a background issue that
was much more political. As he confided to de Schimmelpenninck: ‘There is more to
this than meets the eye because I think there is a certain hostility towards some Swiss
towns that may be chosen instead of Davos, which has the favour of skating (highly
confidential)’.48 Indeed, the Dutch Skating Federation had a distinct preference for
Davos. During the Lisbon Session – which officially bestowed the title of 1st Olympic
Winter Games on Chamonix 1924 – Italy’s Alberto Bonacossa and France’s Melchior
de Polignac supported St Moritz’s bid, undoubtedly following a recommendation
from Coubertin and Baillet-Latour. In turn, de Schimmelpenninck reminded the
Session that the ISU wanted its competitions to take place in Davos. According to
Sigfrid Edstr€om, Sweden’s IOC member and a key figure in the IOC’s negotiations
with Ulrich Salchow, the ISU’s Swedish president, Salchow felt that St Moritz was at
too high an altitude for skating. However, this seems to have been just a pretext as
the ISU subsequently put forward other arguments relating to breaches of the
amateurism rule.49 Despite these controversies, the IOC’s members voted almost
unanimously (22 votes to 0 plus 1 abstention) to award the 1928 Olympic Winter
Games to St Moritz. The abstention, by Sweden’s Clarence von Rosen, was
undoubtedly a gesture of support for his country’s tourism industry.50 However, the
ISU continued its opposition to the IOC by insisting on holding the World Speed
Skating Championships in Davos during the winter of 1928, just a few days before
the Olympic games.51
The discussions over which town should stage the Olympics reveal a somewhat
unexpected link between the local and international rivalries described above.
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Although the competition between Davos and St Moritz was primarily related to local
tourism, the IOC rivalled with the ISU at the international level, with each
organization defending the interests of its network and fighting to control certain
events. The IOC, where Coubertin still wielded influence, concurred with the SOC in
favouring St Moritz, whereas the ISU, dominated by Sweden and the Netherlands,
logically supported Davos, their home-from-home in the heart of Europe and a
bastion of ice skating. From then on, the organisation of the Olympic games in St.
Moritz became a diplomatic matter.
Organising the Games and Defending St Moritz’s Olympic Image: A Multi-
Actor Diplomacy
Once the games had been awarded to St Moritz, they had to be organized, which
meant coordinating all the parties concerned. The SOC played a key role in doing
this, but it was also essential to involve the federal authorities, as one of the main
goals for the event was to enhance the country’s prestige. For this purpose, the Swiss
government chose a reliable diplomat instead of a delegate of its military
administration. Once the games were over, the need to defend Switzerland’s honour
and prestige turned the event into a foreign policy issue. As the literature on
diplomatic incidents shows, even though such considerations may seem relatively
unimportant, they can seriously impact international relations.52 The attacks in the
Swedish press put the Swiss government in a difficult position, especially in a period
when a new agreement between the two countries, signed in 1924, had increased
trade between them.53
On May 17, 1926, the SOC’s secretary general, Francis Messerli, called a plenary
meeting in Bern for the following month in order to constitute an organising
committee for the event. Only then did the SOC ask the Swiss government to assign,
first temporarily and then permanently, a representative to attend future meetings.54
The person the Federal Council chose for this task was Max Ratzenberger, first
secretary to the DPF’s Foreign Affairs Division, who was given the role probably
because he had attended the previous meeting and because he had an excellent
understanding of the international situation, gained during his time as an attache
with the Swiss embassies in Berlin (1909-1910) and Paris (1910-1913), and as
secretary to the Swiss embassies in Buenos Aires (1914-1916), Madrid (1916-1917)
and Vienna (1918-1922).55 Appointing a member of the political department, rather
than a representative of the military department, shows how diplomatically important
the Olympics were to the government. Nevertheless, a month later the SOC asked the
DMF to designate a second representative from the Federal Council, an offer the
DMF declined. Instead, it proposed appointing Colonel Steiner, a head of section in
the infantry department, as an ad hoc delegate responsible for technical issues of
interest to the DMF.56 One such issue was the ‘military patrol’ competition, which
had been contested in Chamonix in 1924 and which the 1925 Prague Congress had
approved for inclusion in the 1928 Olympics. This event was particularly dear to the
DMF, as it was one in which Switzerland excelled and which allowed the army to
show how well it trained its troops. However, a new move by the Scandinavian
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countries took the Swiss by surprise: The Swedish president of the International Ski
Federation, Ivar Holmquist, applied to remove the military patrol from the Olympics.
When the IOC’s Executive Committee, meeting at the Hague on July 31, supported
Holmquist’s proposal,57 Godefroy de Blonay wrote to Baillet-Latour on behalf of the
Swiss government, outlining his country’s objections to the decision and asking him
to review it: ‘This is a very important issue for Switzerland because the DMF is
highly attached to the event and this Department has sole control over the subsidy
for all Olympic Games (including Amsterdam)’.58 The SOC also put pressure on the
IOC to reinstate the military patrol, stating that it did not recognize the international
federation’s authority on this issue. In addition, it suggested asking ‘the Swiss DMF
to extend a special invitation to all the war ministers of the various countries’ and
thereby associate the event with other military competitions, such as horse trials and
the pentathlon.59 Messerli, the SOC’s secretary general, pressed the IOC’s secretary to
win over the Executive Committee, highlighting the insistence of the Swiss
government: ‘I urge you to inform them of the importance the Authorities, the
people of St Moritz, in fact all Swiss people, attach to including the military patrol in
the programme’.60 As to the possibility of including it as a demonstration sport, the
St Moritz organising committee was against the idea, fearing that few countries took
part.61 During a discussion of the issue at the Federal Council on January 28, 1927,
the head of the DMF, Karl Scheurer, supported the Swiss ski federation’s request that
the Federal Council invite countries likely to be interested, arguing that ‘promoting
skiing is not only of military importance for our country, it is also of practical
importance’.62 Switzerland’s efforts were partly successful, as the games included the
military patrol event, but only as a demonstration sport. However, funding for the
Olympics was assured and some excellent news came for local businesses: According
to St Moritz’s mayor, Carl Nater, each and every hotel in the resort was asked to
make at least 20% of its beds available to accommodate participants and officials.
This measure, which involved 1,000 beds, overcame what Nater considered the
greatest difficulty facing St Moritz before the games.63 Thus, Switzerland was
confident it was able to stage a successful Olympic Games. Doing so enabled the
SOC to strengthen Switzerland’s position in the Olympic Movement, raise the
country’s profile abroad, attract more tourists, and allow hoteliers to advertise St
Moritz as ‘the world centre for winter sports’.64
The hotel trade was extremely well represented on the bodies responsible for
organising the St Moritz Olympics. For example, the Administrative Commission was
comprised mostly of hoteliers, alongside a few local grandees, while Hans Badrutt, the
grandson of the legendary Johannes Badrutt, was president of the Reception and
Festivities Commission and Emil Thoma-Badrutt, Hans Badrutt’s brother-in-law, was
the head of the Local Committee.65 Throughout the games period, from February 11 to
19, 1928, these businessmen filled local newspapers and magazines published for
foreigners with adverts for winter and summer holidays.66 Initially, the unfavourable
weather hampered their efforts to promote the resort – mild temperatures had already
been a problem for the organizers of the Chamonix Games four years earlier,67 but
temperatures dropped after a few days, thereby providing better conditions for the
competitions. Nevertheless, the DPF’s fears that Swiss hospitality was criticized once the
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games were over quickly proved to be founded. On February 27, 1928, just a week after
the games had ended, Switzerland’s ambassador in Stockholm, Charles Louis Etienne
Lardy, reported to the DPF’s foreign affairs division that ‘the Scandinavian press has
expressed itself in the most unfavourable terms with respect to the St Moritz Olympic
Games’.68 Idrottsbladet, Sweden’s leading sports newspaper, had gone as far as accusing
the Swiss of coming from a long line of ‘brigands’, but most of the criticism was aimed
at hoteliers. According to Lardy’s translation:
Many guests did not come here for the Games; rather it was the Games that were
brought here for the guests. The hoteliers have to keep up strong competition against
other sporting towns and they were attributed these Games so they could give their
guests a taste of this great feeling, because the Olympic name always has a very
special ring.69
The article in question continued in this vein, evoking the so-called ‘Grafstr€om
affair’, in which the Palace de St Moriz turned out Sweden’s gold-medal-winning
figure skater Gillis Grafstr€om to make way for higher-paying guests. It also criticized
the Swiss organizers, who were accused of cheating in various ways and castigated for
the generally chaotic organization, which led to delayed starts to many ceremonies
and competitions. In addition, the journalist suggested that Switzerland’s military
patrol team was able to use lighter equipment than its competitors because the
specification for the equipment and clothing to be used – described merely as ‘field
equipment’ – was too vague. Sports newspapers were not alone in complaining about
Swiss hoteliers and the organizers of the winter Olympics; negative articles also
appeared in the general press. For example, the liberal daily Stockholms Tidning
reported an argument at the ski-jump hill that allegedly arose when the Swiss agreed
to jump from the top platform but the Norwegians refused because they felt the
weather was not good enough to do so safely:
The quarrel became increasingly violent and the Norwegians wanted to come down and
stop the event. But €Ostgaard [president of the Norwegian ski federation] ordered them
to start from the middle platform, adding that it was the last time Norway would
compete in Switzerland. A Swiss competitor, named Feuz, brandishing a knife, wanted
to force the Norwegian starter to order his countrymen to start from the top and tried
to cut the rope the starter had put above the middle platform … In Scandinavia there
is the general impression that the Swiss organizers’ only concern was to satisfy the
spectators’ appetite for spectacle and that their attitude was irresponsible.70
While it is possible that there was an actual issue with organization, Giuseppe
Motta, head of the DPF, saw things differently: Passing on these criticisms to his
opposite number at the DMF, Karl Scheurer, he asked him to gather the information
needed to counter these ‘outrageously fanciful comments’. He went on:
it is not surprising … that the Scandinavians, who have always stubbornly opposed
creating a special cycle of winter games, so they can maintain their monopoly, have
seized the occasion to take out their bitterness on St Moritz, whose worldwide
reputation they envy, and they will stop at nothing to turn its clientele away to
their benefit.71
Motta’s letter shows how important the issue was to Switzerland. His references to
Switzerland’s ‘worldwide reputation’ and to the clientele the Scandinavians were
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supposedly trying to poach from Switzerland highlights the economic and tourism
interests at stake. The DPF’s foreign affairs department informed the heads of the
SOC and asked them to provide all relevant information.72 Messerli replied that an
enquiry had been launched to clarify what had happened but that the SOC and
organising committee had not received any complaints until then.73 On March 31,
1928, St Moritz’s mayor, Carl Nater, wrote to the DPF about the Scandinavian press’s
criticisms of his resort. According to Nater, the allegations were not only completely
unjustified, they were very surprising because Sven Lindhagen, who had written the
articles for Idrottsbladet, had taken part in the information tour for journalists in
January 1927 and had not, at this time, expressed the slightest criticism of
Switzerland’s resorts.
One could wonder why the attacks came from Sweden, rather than Norway, a
country with which there had been intense competition and numerous conflicts
during the games. The most probable answer is that the heads of the ISU, who had
wanted the Olympics to take place in Davos, directly instigated the Swedish press
campaign. In addition, when Norway won the military patrol event, Karl Scheurer,
the head of the DFM had praised the Norwegian delegation in his official speech,
suggesting that its ‘fame would extend to the entire country’.74 Another possibility is
that attacks from Norway have not come to light due to a lack of sources or due to
the Swiss ambassador in Oslo reacting less strongly to criticisms in the Norwegian
press than his opposite number in Stockholm.
Pax Olympica as a Showcase of Swiss Foreign Policy
The development of winter sports competitions was intrinsically linked to the
tourism industry. The organizers of the Chamonix games, four years before St
Moritz, wanted to show that the resort had developed to the point where it could
rival the successful Swiss model.75 In contrast, St Moritz 1928 had both economic
and sporting goals: while the resort’s hoteliers wanted to promote the town as a
tourism destination ahead of their Scandinavian rivals, the Olympic circles tried to
demonstrate the superiority of the winter Olympics over the Nordic Games.
However, they could not turn a blind eye to the importance of the local and
international rivalries that surrounded this edition of the winter Olympics, as well as
to the different interests of the stakeholders who came together to organize the event.
As for Switzerland, St Moritz 1928 was the first international sports competition to
bring together such a wide range of stakeholders and thereby crystallize public and
semi-public actions around an event capable of making or breaking the country’s
reputation as a tourist destination. Although the federal government played a central
role in coordinating the project’s stakeholders, it was the SOC’s ‘diplomats in
tracksuits’76 who lobbied the IOC, exhibiting a form of diplomacy that was halfway
between government diplomacy and international sports diplomacy.
Consequently, the development of winter sports competitions and the desire of
Switzerland’s sports and tourism sectors to host the Olympic games contributed
greatly to creating a sports lobby within Swiss political and administrative circles
during the 1920s. This proved useful when the SOC had to use its political network
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to gain government support for the St Moritz Olympics. The Swiss government’s aim
was not just to help the country’s tourism industry, but also to strengthen its own
role in spreading the ‘spirit of Locarno’. In other words, it hoped to use its ‘tradition’
for arbitrage to reintegrate Germany, its big neighbour and preferred economic
partner during the interwar period, into the concert of nations.77 Having joined the
League of Nations in 1926, Germany became an Olympic nation again at St Moritz,
where it headed the Olympic parade. Thus, Switzerland realized that the pax
olympica could serve as a showcase in the process of creating the balance its foreign
policy had been trying to achieve since the early 1920s.78
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